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Abstract
We examine wage competition in a model where identical workers choose the number of jobs
to apply for and identical firms simultaneously post a wage. The Nash equilibrium of this game
exhibits the following properties: (i) an equilibrium where workers apply for just one job exhibits
unemployment and absence of wage dispersion; (ii) an equilibrium where workers apply for two
or for more (but not for all) jobs always exhibits wage dispersion and, typically, unemployment;
(iii) the equilibrium wage distribution with a higher vacancy-to-unemployment ratio first-order
stochastically dominates the wage distribution with a lower level of labor market tightness; (iv)
the average wage is non-monotonic in the number of applications; (v) the equilibrium number
of applications is non-monotonic in the vacancy-to-unemployment ratio; (vi) a minimum wage
increase can be welfare improving because it compresses the wage distribution and reduces the
congestion effects caused by the socially excessive number of applications; and (vii) the only way
to obtain efficiency is to impose a mandatory wage that eliminates wage dispersion altogether.
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1 Introduction
At www.monster.com, unemployed workers can, at the cost of a few mouse clicks, observe all posted
vacancies within a given region for a certain occupation. Most of the posted vacancies give a detailed
job description but show no wage information. At the academic job market, candidates often send
out more than 50 applications simultaneously without knowing precisely the wages they will be
paid. The focus of this paper is on the features and efficiency properties of markets with the above
characteristics. We present a model in which firms set wages, and workers apply to one or more
jobs simultaneously. The number of applications a worker sends out when looking for a job and
the wages that the firms set are endogenously determined in equilibrium.1 We are interested in the
existence and the properties of Nash equilibria in this game.
In our model, the exogenous variables are: the relative size of the labor force, worker’s applica-
tion cost and the number of candidates that a firm can consider. Conditional on those variables we
derive the number of matches, the wage distribution and the unemployment rate. The model has a
number of novel features. First, the arrival rate of job offers is endogenous and sensitive to key labor
market parameters such as the vacancy-to-unemployment ratio and the minimum wage. Secondly,
we explicitly model the extent of congestion effects caused by the intensity of job search. This has
important implications for the desirability of minimum wage increases or mandatory wages that
eliminate wage dispersion altogether. Usually, search intensity is treated as a technology parameter
(Pissarides, 2000), that increases the match probability for a worker. For the aggregate number of
matches it does not matter whether the number of workers or the search intensity is doubled. In our
model, a higher search intensity leads to more coordination problems between firms, as in Albrecht
et al. (2004), and may thus lead to fewer matches; this may help explain the finding of Kuhn and
Skuterud (2004) that Internet search does not reduce unemployment duration. Furthermore, since
workers who receive multiple offers pick the job with the highest wage, wage dispersion increases
the individual incentives to apply. In this respect our model differs from Shimer (2004). However,
workers do not internalize the congestion effects of their applications and therefore, the equilibrium
is not (constrained) efficient.
We study a market with v ≥ 1 vacancies and u ≥ 2 unemployed workers. We consider recruit-
ment technologies Rm where a firm offers the job to a first candidate picked at random (if it has
1The model is therefore not subject to the “partial-partial” critique of Rothschild (1973).
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any) and if it fails to hire her it offers the job to the next candidate (if present) and so on and so
forth till its m− th candidate (if present). We focus on the two extreme cases of this recruitment
technology. First, R1, the one explored in Albrecht et al. (2003), where firms with candidates pick
one worker at random, offer the job to her and the market closes. In the other extreme, Ru, where
firms that fail to hire their first candidate can offer the job to their second candidate, and so on
till the very last applicant they have. Workers who receive multiple offers take the one with the
highest wage.
Depending on the cost involved in completing an application and on the minimum wage, there
may be equilibria where workers either apply to just one job or apply to several jobs. When workers
apply to just one job we get the standard Diamond (1971) result that the wage distribution is
degenerate at the minimum wage. This follows from the fact that a firm only has an incentive to
offer higher wages than other firms if this increases the hiring probability, but this cannot happen
when all workers apply to just one job. We find that this type of result can only be sustained when,
for a given level of the minimum wage, application costs are neither too high, which prevents worker
participation, nor too low, which gives a worker incentives to deviate by applying to multiple jobs
in order to increase her hiring probability. This contrasts with for example Acemoglu and Shimer
(2000), where a monopsony equilibrium exists always.
When application cost are low, workers send multiple applications and the equilibrium is char-
acterized by wage dispersion. The nature of the wage dispersion is similar to Burdett and Judd
(1983), Lang (1991) and Acemoglu and Shimer (2000) where some workers observe more than one
wage while others sample just one. In our model, some workers receive one offer and others receive
two or more. In Burdett and Mortensen (1998), by contrast, wage dispersion arises because a firm’s
wage offer may arrive either at an employed worker (who are choosier) or at an unemployed worker,
while in Albrecht and Axell (1984) it arises because workers have different reservation wages.
We now briefly discuss the unemployment features of the labor market equilibria. Recruitment
technologies other than Ru naturally lead to unemployment simply because workers cannot coor-
dinate where they send their applications. But even under recruitment technology Ru, the most
likely outcome is unemployment because the absence of it requires that workers apply to as many
jobs as there are workers, which is unlikely to occur in large markets with costly applications.
Some of the mechanisms that are at work in our model are illustrated by a simple 3 worker-3 firm
economy. In this context, we discuss the difference between the recruitment technologies R1 and
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R3. We find that the equilibrium characteristics are to a large extent invariant to the recruitment
technology. The example also illustrates that individual incentives often lead to inefficient outcomes
and that a minimum wage can be used to align the private and the social incentives. In the
final part of the paper we examine large labor markets and we focus on R1 because that allows
us to solve the model for large u and v. This gets extremely tedious under other recruitment
mechanisms and the insights are similar as shown in the 3x3 market. In this context, we first
explore the relationship between the equilibrium wage distribution and labor market tightness on
the one hand, and the number of applications on the other hand. We find that, for a given number
of applications, the equilibrium wage distribution with a higher vacancy-to-unemployment ratio
first-order stochastically dominates the wage distribution with a lower labor market tightness. By
contrast, a result in terms of first-order stochastic dominance cannot be established when comparing
firm equilibria for different numbers of applications. We find that the average wage is non-monotonic
(first increasing and then decreasing) in the number of applications. This is due to two facts that
affect firm competitiveness in opposite directions: more applications increase the maximum number
of offers a worker can receive but reduce the probability that a particular application leads to an
offer.
Secondly, we explore how the equilibrium number of applications relates to labor market tight-
ness. We find again a non-monotonic relationship. If the vacancy-to-unemployment ratio is ini-
tially small and it increases, then workers respond by sending more applications in equilibrium.
By contrast, if the market tightness parameter is large to start with, an increase in the vacancy-
to-unemployment ratio leads to fewer applications. The intuition for this result comes from the
incentives workers have to send out applications. On the one hand, more applications increase the
chance to get at least one job offer. On the other hand, more applications increase the expected
maximum wage offer. When the vacancy-to-unemployment ratio is very small, the wage distribu-
tion is skewed towards the minimum wage. As the v/u−ratio goes up, wages increase and workers
marginal gains to apply rise. When the vacancy-to-unemployment rate is large, the wage distrib-
ution is compressed in the neighborhood of the competitive wage and then the marginal gains to
apply fall as the vacancy-to-unemployment rate increases further.
We then study the relationship between the equilibrium number of applications and the mini-
mum wage. Again, the way the minimum wage affects workers incentives to send out applications
hinges upon labor market tightness: when there are few (many) firms per worker, an increase in the
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minimum wage leads to more (less) applications. The intuition for this result is related to the fact
that the wage distribution and the minimum wage keep a monotonic relationship so, for example,
when the wage distribution is already quite skewed towards the competitive wage, an increase in
the minimum wage reduces workers incentives to apply. This motivates the question whether the
minimum wage can be a useful policy instrument to enhance efficiency in our labor market.
To pursue this line of inquiry, we turn to examine whether private incentives lead to aggregate
efficiency. We first observe that, irrespective of the level of the minimum wage, the number of
applications workers send in equilibrium is excessive from a social welfare perspective. The idea
here is that an individual worker does not internalize the effects that his/her applications cause
on the other workers. This result contrasts with Acemoglu and Shimer (2000), where there is too
little search in equilibrium because some workers free-ride on the search of others. The difference
in results arises due to the additional motives workers have to send out applications in our setting:
higher search intensity increases not only the expected wage but also the hiring probability. It then
follows that an increase in the minimum wage is desirable if the vacancy-to-unemployment ratio is
relatively large because in that case the equilibrium number of applications is reduced and welfare
rises. This mechanism is new to our knowledge. When there is already a lot of competition for
workers, extra applications are not desirable. Introducing a minimum wage reduces the number of
applications by compressing the wage distribution and this can increase employment by reducing
coordination frictions. By contrast, if the number of vacancies is small relative to the number
of workers, then a minimum wage increase gives workers incentives to send more applications in
equilibrium, which worsens the situation. We show that (constrained) efficiency can be achieved
in our setting by imposing a particular mandatory wage that eliminates wage dispersion altogether
and consequently one of the motives workers have to send applications.
The last issue we examine is how our equilibrium is affected by free entry of vacancies. We first
explore the relationship between firm’s incentives to enter the economy and the minimum wage for
a given number of applications. Not surprisingly, we find that entry incentives are monotonically
decreasing in the minimum wage. Secondly, we explore how firm entry is affected by the number
of applications workers send out. We find that firm’s incentives to enter are non-monotonic (first
decreasing then increasing) in the number of applications. Thirdly, we find that, from the point
of view of social welfare, entry is excessive if the minimum wage is low, while it is insufficient
if the minimum wage is large. Finally, we look at how the minimum wage affects the free-entry
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equilibrium with an endogenous number of applications. Since the equilibrium conditions for labor
market tightness and the number of applications are highly non-linear, the long-run implication
of changes in the minimum wage are highly sensitive to the market’s initial conditions. In the
long-run equilibrium, an increase in the minimum wage always leads to exit and, if initially there
are sufficiently many firms in the market, to more applications, otherwise to fewer applications.
Our analysis is further related to the consumer search models of Burdett and Judd (1983) and
Janssen and Moraga-González (2004). The fundamental difference between those models and our
labor market model is that here vacancies can only be occupied by a single worker whereas in the
goods market, rationing is usually less important. Workers anticipate the labor market frictions
that arise from rationing and send an excessive amount of applications, which in turn may amplify
the extent of the frictions.
The nature of unemployment in our model is similar to the directed search models of Mont-
gomery (1991), Burdett, Shi, Wright (2001) and Albrecht et al. (2003). When workers apply to one
job only, some vacancies receive multiple applications while others receive none. Accordingly, some
workers receive no offers and remain unemployed while others receive multiple offers. Albrecht et al.
(2003) show that when workers apply to multiple jobs, this coordination failure does not disappear
but becomes less important. Our work is important in this sense because workers do not only take
into account the magnitude of these frictions but also the wage they expect to get when they decide
upon the number of applications to send out. Another difference is that in our model, search is
random, capturing the idea that there are characteristics about the job that the worker only finds
out after the firm has been contacted.2 This generates atomless wage distributions in equilibrium
while they derive two-point distributions. Whether search is random or directed is ultimately an
empirical question. However casual evidence shows that some job advertisements do post a wage
and, as in the example above, some don’t.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the basic game. In section 3 we provide
some properties of the equilibria. In section 4 we fully solve a 3x3 example for both R1 and R3. This
simple example captures the main mechanisms that are at work and shows that different recruiting
technologies lead to similar insights. Section 5 discusses a number of general results for large labor
markets and some policy implications. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2For example, even though assistant professors may have some idea about the starting salaries at different univer-
sities, the amount of effort they have to put in the job depends on the teaching load, types of courses that must be
taught, management duties, etc., which typically are revealed after the contact has taken place.
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2 The labor market
We consider a single period labor market model with u ≥ 2 risk neutral unemployed workers and
v ≥ 1 risk neutral vacancies. Firms, indexed by the subscript i, post wages. We assume that each
firm has exactly one vacancy. A strategy for firm i is a wage offer, denoted Fi(w). Wages must be
posted above the minimum wage, denoted w; this enables us to study the effects of minimum wage
policies.3 When a worker is matched with a vacancy they produce one unit of output.
Workers, indexed by the subscript j, who manage to get a job receive a gross utility equal to
the wage w they are paid. To be able to receive wage offers, workers must send applications to the
vacancies and complete the recruitment procedures. A typical worker knows the location of firms
but she only learns about the wage of a firm after she has applied there and her application results
in a wage offer. Applying to a job is costly. We assume that it costs a worker k > 0 to complete and
submit an application. Let a denote the number of applications that a worker sends to different
vacancies. A strategy for a worker j is the number of applications to send out: aj = {1, 2, ..., v}.4
If a worker receives two or more wage offers, she chooses the vacancy that offers the highest wage.
Workers and firms play a simultaneous move game. A firm chooses a wage offer taking as given
the wage offers of the rest of the firms as well as the number of applications sent by the workers. A
worker decides how many applications to send taking as given the wages offered by the firms as well
as the number of applications sent by the other workers. Once applications and wages have been
decided upon, a firm obtaining multiple applications randomly picks a candidate and offers the job
to her. If the candidate has no better offers, she accepts it while if she has better offer(s) she rejects
it. Whether the firm can in the latter case go to its next candidate(s) depends on the degree of
market frictions. To capture this idea we assume the following mechanism for the recruitment of
workers:
Definition 1 Let Rm be a recruitment technology. Under Rm, a firm that fails to hire its first
3Alternatively, nothing is lost when w is interpreted as unemployment income. Then, wages must be quoted above
w to attract workers, and changes in w enable us to examine the implications of unemployment benefits.
4We are limiting the workers’ strategy set in the sense that a worker cannot address her applications to particular
vacancies. The implication of this assumption is that if a worker sends a applications, the probability that a randomly
selected vacancy gets an application from the worker in question is a/v. Since we focus on symmetric equilibria where
identical workers use the same strategies, this is not restrictive. Equilibria where, say, worker 1 applies with probability
one to firm A and worker 2 with probability 1 to firm B etc. are not so interesting because they require a lot of
coordination, which is difficult to achieve, in particular when the labor market is large. Furthermore, we assume that
workers play pure strategies in terms of the number of applications they send out.
7
candidate (if any) can make an offer to its second candidate (if any), and so on till its m − th
candidate (if any), m = 1, 2, 3, ..., u.
In Albrecht et al. (2003, 2004) it is assumed that screening a worker takes one period. This
recruitment technology, labelled R1, captures a situation where frictions are quite large so that a
firm that fails to hire its first candidate closes its vacancy. The other extreme case is a situation
where screening is costless so that a firm that fails to hire its first candidate can always go back
to the next candidate(s). We label this screening technology, Ru because the maximum number
of candidates a firm may have is u. The hiring procedure under Ru stops when all firms with
applicants have hired a worker that did not get hired by some other firm. Obviously, in markets
with relatively high frictions R1 makes more sense that Ru, while the opposite holds true in markets
with no frictions. Even though in general we expect intermediate technologies R2, ..., Ru−1 to be
in place in real world markets, we focus on the two extreme cases R1 and Ru in the remainder
of the paper. One of the results we obtain is that these different recruitment technologies lead
to similar qualitative results, so one would expect the same economic trade-offs to appear for the
other screening technologies.
We focus on symmetric Nash equilibria of the game we described above. Asymmetric equilibria
will in general exist but are not so interesting in large labor markets because they require a lot of
coordination of the agents.
3 Equilibria
Our first result characterizes the number of applications a that can be part of an equilibrium for
different recruitment technologies.
Lemma 1 Under Ru, only a ≤ min{u, v} can be part of an equilibrium, while under Rm all a ≤ v
can be part of an equilibrium, m = 1, 2, 3, ..., u− 1.
Proof. Consider Ru. Assume first that min{u, v} = v. Since workers do not send multiple appli-
cations to the same firm it trivially follows that a ≤ v. Assume now that min{u, v} = u. We now
prove that a > u cannot be part of an equilibrium. Suppose, on the contrary that a ≥ u + 1. In
that case all the workers as a collective would be in contact with a number of vacancies equal to
or greater than u + 1. Then, it is readily seen that firms’ wage setting must be competitive, i.e.,
wi = 1, i = 1, 2, ..., v. But then any worker would gain by reducing the number of applications to u.
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Under Rm, m = 1, 2, 3, ..., u−1, this argument fails because in that case, even if all the workers are
in contact with a number of vacancies equal to or greater than u+1, the probability a given worker
gets a job is strictly less than 1. As a result, any number of applications a ≤ v can potentially be
part of an equilibrium. ¥
Our next result states some general features of wage equilibria.
Proposition 1 For any u, v and Rm, (i) if an equilibrium exists where workers send just one ap-
plication, the equilibrium wage distribution must be degenerate at the minimum wage w; (ii) if an
equilibrium exists where v > a ≥ 2 then there must be wage dispersion and the wage distribution
must be atomless; (iii) for any u and v, if an equilibrium exists where a = v = min{u, v}, the equi-
librium wage distribution must be degenerate at the minimum wage w under recruitment technology
Ru and atomless under R1, R2, ..., Ru−1.
The proof, which is in the appendix, goes along the following lines. (i) When a = 1, the
probability that a given worker also gets an offer from a competing firm is 0, hence no firm has an
incentive to offer w > w. So when a = 1 the equilibrium wage distribution must be degenerate at
w = w. (ii) When min{u, v} > a ≥ 2, we can prove the statement above by contradiction. The proof
is similar to Burdett and Judd (1983) and Lang (1991). Assume that all firms post some wage w
in [w, 1) in equilibrium. First, we show that there is always a positive probability that a vacancy
remains unmatched. Second, we establish the contradiction. Equilibrium profits are: πi = ρ(1−w),
where ρ is the probability to fill a vacancy. We show that a firm, say i, can do better by deviating
and offer a higher wage, say w+ε. The firm in question will then always succeed in hiring a worker,
provided that it obtains at least an application. This occurs with a probability greater than ρ. By
deviating, the firm therefore makes profits which are strictly higher than πi for sufficiently small
ε > 0. This argument rules out all wages in [w, 1). It remains to be proved that a wage distribution
degenerated at w = 1 cannot be an equilibrium either when min{u, v} > a ≥ 2. Note that in this
case firms would make zero profits in equilibrium. If a firm deviates and offers a lower wage, say
w, this firm would obtain a profit πDi = ρD(1 − w), where ρD is the probability that the deviant
is matched with a worker. To rule out this case we show that ρD > 0. We finally rule out mass
points with similar arguments. (iii) Under RU , if a = v ≤ u, each firm gets u applications and
hires a worker with probability 1 and no firm has an incentive to offer a wage above the minimum
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wage. Under R1, ..., Ru−1, there is always competition for workers and therefore the arguments in
(ii) also hold here.
Proposition 1 highlights the influence of multiple applications by workers on wage setting and
vice versa. Workers are more likely to send multiple applications in equilibrium when there is
wage dispersion. Moreover, wage setting can only be dispersed if a firm faces a positive probability
that an applicant is hired by some other firm, which necessarily requires that the applicant sends
multiple applications. Therefore, wage dispersion and multiple applications are phenomena that are
typically observed together. It is worth to remark that an equilibrium where wages are competitive
does not exist in this market.
Our next result discusses general unemployment features of equilibria. If the number of vacancies
is smaller than the number of unemployed workers then unemployment arises trivially. More
interestingly:
Proposition 2 Let v ≥ u. If an equilibrium exists where a < u, then unemployment arises with
strictly positive probability, irrespective of the recruitment technology. If an equilibrium exists where
a = u, under Ru there is absence of unemployment, while under R1, ..., Ru−1, unemployment does
arise with positive probability.
Proof. Note that if a = u < v, workers always get matched with a vacancy under Ru. However if
a < u < v, the probability that all unemployed workers only apply to a firms is strictly positive.
In that case a maximum of a < v workers get matched with vacancies and the remaining u − a
workers fail to find a job. For the R1, ...Ru−1 case there is always a positive probability that a firm
looses all its candidates to rival firms.5 ¥
Proposition 2 highlights that unemployment is a natural phenomenon in our job market model,
even if the number of vacancies is greater than the number of workers. This is due to the fact
that workers cannot coordinate where to send their applications, which implies that some vacancies
receive multiple applications from different workers, while others get a single application or no
applications at all. Since firms can only hire a single worker, unemployment arises with positive
probability.
5Consider for example the case where workers 1, 2, 3 apply to firm A, B, C. There is a positive probability that
all firms consider workers 1 and 3 in which case, 2 remains unmatched and one of the vacancies fails to hire a worker.
This argument can be made with any number of workers and jobs. Under Ru−1, there is always a positive probability
that none of the v vacancies considers worker i.
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Another aspect of this result is that full employment is always associated with wage dispersion
(except for the special case in which the number of vacancies is equal to the number of workers
looking for a job and employers apply screening technology Ru, see Proposition 1). This result
illustrates that it is typically the case that full employment can only be achieved at the cost of
wage inequality because this increases the search intensity.
We now move to the existence and characterization of equilibria. The next result characterizes
existence of a degenerate wage equilibrium where workers apply for a single vacancy. For this
purpose we define the following function that gives the expected payoffs of participating in the
labor market for a = 1. It is simply equal to the “urn-ball” probability of getting a job offer times
the minimum wage:
γ1(w;u, v) =
ρv
u w. (1)
where
ρ = 1−
µ
1− 1v
¶u
. (2)
Proposition 3 Let γ1(w;u, v) ≥ k ≥
h
1−
¡
1− zd
¢2iw−γ1(w;u, v), where 1− 1−(1− 1v )u−1(1− 2v )v(u+1)
≥ zd ≥ 0. Then there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies where all firms post
the minimum wage w and workers apply to only one of the vacancies. In equilibrium, a worker is
unemployed with probability 1− γ1(w;u, v)/w, a vacancy remains unfilled with probability
¡
1− 1v
¢u
and a firm’s expected profit is πi =
¡
1−
¡
1− 1v
¢u¢
(1− w). This holds irrespective of the screening
technology.
In the proof, which is in the appendix, we show that it must be the case that k is sufficiently
low for workers to participate in the labor market, and sufficiently high to ensure that a worker
does not find it beneficial to deviate by applying to 2, 3 or more vacancies.
We now turn to the existence of wage-dispersed equilibria with multiple applications. We first
note that, given a worker strategy a ≥ 2, the number of applications a firm receives is given
by a binomial distribution, bin(u, a/v). Since in our model every firm has only one vacancy, our
wage setting game has the features of a Bertrand pricing game with capacity constrained firms.
Following Dasgupta and Maskin (1986), it is easy to see that our game has a firm equilibrium in
mixed strategies for given a. This is because (i) a firm’s strategy space is the closed real interval
[w, 1], (ii) a firm’s payoff function is continuous in w except in the event that the wage the firm offers
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to a worker coincides with the wage of some other firm which considers the very same candidate and
this wage happens to be the best offer the worker receives (so the set of payoff discontinuities has
measure zero), and (iii) the sum of all firms’ payoffs is a continuous function in a firm’s strategy
because a firm only steals a worker from another firm when both firms get the same profit per
worker. Theorem 5 in Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) proves that an equilibrium in mixed strategies
exists.
In the next section we therefore focus on providing a 3x3 example that highlights all the key
mechanisms that are at work in our model. This Section illustrates that the recruitment technology
is not so important for the qualitative nature of the results. In Section 5 we let the labor market
get large in the usual way, i.e., u, v →∞, with vu = θ and fully analyze a market where Rm = R1.
4 A market with 3 vacancies and 3 workers
This section serves several purposes. First, it illustrates the properties of Nash equilibria in a
simple environment. In particular we focus on the nature of wage dispersion and unemployment
as well as on the lack of efficiency of market equilibrium. Second, it shows that different recruiting
technologies lead to qualitatively similar results; this is because the economic trade-offs firms and
workers face are common to both technologies. Finally, we see that these trade-offs are of different
magnitude under R1 than under R3 and we find that there is more competition for workers under
R1, which results in higher wages and higher unemployment than under R3.
4.1 The R3 recruitment technology
Consider a market where u = 3 and v = 3 and Rm = R3. From Lemma 1 it follows that we must
examine equilibria with workers applying for 1, 2 and 3 jobs. Proposition 3 yields the equilibrium
characterization when workers apply to just one job. From (1) it follows that γ1(w, 3, 3) = 19w/27
and it is straightforward to show that a worker who deviates by sending out 2 applications has a
chance of 17/18 to get a job offer. Then:
Claim 1 Let u, v = 3 and assume γ1(w, 3, 3) ≥ k ≥ 1718w − γ1(w, 3, 3). There exists a unique
symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies where all firms post the minimum wage w and workers
apply to only one of the vacancies. In equilibrium, a worker is employed with probability 19/27, a
vacancy remains unfilled with probability 8/27 and the expected profit for a firm is πi = 1927(1−w).
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Assume now that workers send multiple applications, in particular a = 2. Then by Proposition
2 there does not exist a firm equilibrium in pure strategies. We now present the wage-dispersed
equilibrium that arises in this setting. For this purpose let us define σn:v as the expected value of
the n-th highest wage in a random draw of size v from a wage distribution F (w). Moreover let
φ21(w) =
13
81
σ1:3 + 1
9
σ2:3 − 1
162
σ3:3 (3)
φ23(w) =
13
81
σ1:3 + 2
81
σ2:3 − 7
81
σ2:3.
Claim 2 Let u, v = 3 and and φ21(w) ≥ k ≥ φ23(w). Then, under R3 a unique symmetric equi-
librium of the game described above exists where vacancies offer wages from the set [w, 21w+526 ]
according to the cumulative wage distribution
F (w) = 4
3
− 1
3
s
16− 63(w −w)
(1− w) (4)
and workers send out 2 applications. In equilibrium workers get a job with probability 73/81 and
each firm receives an expected payoff of πi = 2127(1− w).
Proof. The payoff to a firm offering a wage w when the rivals offer a random draw from F (w) is
πi(w;F (w)) =
h
p1:3F 2(w) + 2p2:3F (w) [1− F (w)] + p3:3 [1− F (w)]2
i
(1− w) (5)
where p1:3, p2:3 and p3:3 are the probabilities that a firm offering the highest, second highest and
lowest wage in the market hires a worker, respectively. In Appendix B1 we show that p1:3 = 26/27,
p2:3 = 25/27 and p3:3 = 21/27. Substitution of them in (5) yields:
πi(w;F (w)) =
·
−1
9
F 2(w) + 8
27
F (w) + 21
27
¸
(1−w)
The lower bound of the support of the wage distribution F (w) must be w. Setting w = w yields
equilibrium profits: πi(w) = 2127 (1− w) . Let w denote the upper bound of the wage distribution.
In a mixed strategy equilibrium, a firm must be indifferent between offering any wage in w ∈ (w,w)
and offering the minimum wage w. Thus, F (w) must solve πi(w;F (w)) = πi(w), which yields (4).
Setting F (w) = 1 and solving for w yields the upper bound of the support of the wage distribution.
Figure 1 represents the cumulative wage distribution and the frequency of wages. It is interesting
to observe that high wages are more frequent than low wages, the reason being that when workers
send two applications, firms must compete intensively to hire a worker.
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(a) Wage distribution (b) Wage density
Figure 1: Equilibrium wage distribution and wage density (a = 2, w=0.2)
For the wage distribution (4) to be an equilibrium, we must also establish that workers have no
incentives to deviate. Since a worker can be hired either for the highest, the medium, or for the
minimum wage, the expected payoff for a worker when a = 2 is given by:
Ue(a = 2) = σ1:3q1:3 + σ2:3q2:3 + σ3:3q3:3 − 2k
The probabilities of being hired at different wages q1:3, q2:3and q3:3 are derived in appendix B2.
Equilibrium expected gains to a worker who sends 2 applications can then be rewritten as:6
Ue(a = 2) = 26
81
σ1:3 + 25
81
σ2:3 + 22
81
σ3:3 − 2k.
In equilibrium, a worker must obtain non-negative expected utility, which yields the following
parametric restriction:
k ≤ 13
81
σ1:3 + 25
162
σ2:3 + 11
81
σ3:3
Let φ20(w) denote the RHS of this inequality.
In addition, for F (w) to be an equilibrium it must be the case that workers neither want to send
a single application nor 3 applications. Consider first the case of a deviant worker who sends out 3
6We note that this expected utility can be calculated using the wage distribution (4). For this,
note that σn:al =
] ∞
−∞
al!
(n−1)!(al−n)!
wF (w)n−1 (1− F (w))al−n f(w)dw, σ1:3 = 3
U
wF 2(w)f(w)dw , σ2:3 =
U
6w (1− F (w))F (w)f(w)dw and σ3:3 =
U
3w(1 − F (w))2f(w)dw. Therefore, the expected utility for a worker
who sends out 2 applications is:
Ue(a = 2) =
] w
w

2
9
F (w)− 2
27
F 2(w) + 22
27

wf(w)dw − 2k.
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applications rather than 2. This worker secures a job but incurs higher application costs. Let q1:33
be the probability that the deviant gets an offer with the highest wage; likewise, let q2:33 and q3:33
be the probability that she gets the second highest wage and the lowest wage when deviating to 3
applications, respectively. In appendix B3 we derive that q1:33 = 13/27, q2:33 = 1/3 and q3:33 = 5/27.
Then, the expected utility for the deviant is given by
Ued(ad = 3) =
13
27
σ1:3 + 1
3
σ2:3 + 5
27
σ3:3 − 3k
Deviating to a = 3 is not profitable if
Ue(a = 2) ≥ Ued(ad = 3), or: (6)
k ≥
µ
13
27
− 26
81
¶
σ1:3 +
µ
1
3
− 25
81
¶
σ2:3 +
µ
5
27
− 22
81
¶
σ3:3
k ≥ 13
81
σ1:3 + 2
81
σ2:3 − 7
81
σ3:3 = φ23(w)
Finally, we have to establish when it is not profitable to deviate to a = 1. Consider a worker who
deviates and sends out just one application. As before, let q1:31 be the probability that this deviant
gets the maximum wage, q2:31 be the probability she gets the second highest wage, and q3:31 be the
probability to get the lowest wage. We derive in appendix B.3 that q1:31 = 13/81, q2:31 = 16/81 and
q3:3 = 15/54. The expected utility for a deviant in this case is given by:
Ued(ad = 1) =
13
81
σ1:3 + 16
81
σ2:3 + 15
54
σ3:3 − k
Deviating to a = 1 is not profitable if:
Ue(a = 2) ≥ Ued(a = 1) or: (7)
k ≤
µ
26
81
− 13
81
¶
σ1:3 +
µ
25
81
− 16
81
¶
σ2:3 +
µ
22
81
− 15
54
¶
σ3:3
k ≤ 13
81
σ1:3 + 1
9
σ2:3 − 1
162
σ3:3 = φ21(w)
Note that φ21(w) ≤ φ20(w); therefore if condition (7) holds, workers obtain non-negative utility.
The proof is now complete. ¥
We finally consider the case where each worker sends 3 applications. The following result
characterizes equilibrium in this case. Let Ω(w) = w/3.
Claim 3 Let u, v = 3 and k ≤ Ω(w). Then under R3 a unique symmetric equilibrium exists where
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all vacancies offer the minimum wage w and workers send out three applications. In equilibrium
workers get a job for sure and firms receive an expected payoff of πi = (1− w).
Proof. When workers apply to all 3 jobs, firms get a worker for sure and have no incentive to
pay a wage above the minimum wage. The expected payoff for a worker is Ue(a = 3) = w − 3k.
In equilibrium, a worker must obtain non-negative expected utility. This yields the parametric
restriction k ≤ 13w = Ω(w).
We now check the conditions under which workers do not deviate. Consider a worker who
deviates by sending out 2 applications. The probability that this worker gets no job is 13 . This
occurs when vacancies to which the deviant applies for get occupied by other workers. Hence, the
expected payoff for the deviant is Ued(ad = 2) = 23w − 2k. Deviating to a = 2 is not profitable if
Ue(a = 3) ≥ Ued(ad = 2) or w − 3k ≥ 23w − 2k, which is always satisfied when the non-negative
expected utility condition holds. Deviating to a = 1 is obviously a less profitable deviation when
k ≤ w/3. This completes the proof. ¥
Overview of equilibria for the case of 3 vacancies and 3 workers under R3.
As shown above, in a market with 3 vacancies and 3 workers equilibria exist where workers
apply to either one, two or three vacancies. When workers apply to two vacancies, the equilibrium
exhibits wage dispersion while when workers apply to either one or three jobs, all firms post the
minimum wage with probability one in equilibrium. When workers apply for one or two jobs, there
is unemployment while each worker gets a job for sure when they apply for three jobs.
Firm profits are increasing in the number of applications in this 3x3 example. An increase in
workers search intensity has two effects. On the one hand, it increases competition between firms,
which tends to reduce firms’ profits. On the other hand, firms increase the probability to fill their
vacancies. The second effect is of greater magnitude in this example and thus firms’ profits are
increasing in the number of applications sent by the workers in equilibrium. In the next section we
show that this does not hold in a more general setting.
The different equilibria exist for distinct parameter constellations. In Figure 2(a) we have
plotted, in the (k,w) space, the functions γ(·), φ21(·), φ23(·) and Ω(·) that appear in the Propositions
above. These functions define the parameter areas for which the different equilibria exist. The
shaded regions labelled “a = 1”, “a = 2” and “a = 3” indicate the distinct equilibria. The Figure
reveals that for high costs of application, say kH , only the equilibrium where workers apply to just
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one job exists and this requires the minimum wage to be quite high. For intermediate application
costs, say kM , if the minimum wage is high an equilibrium with a = 2 or a = 3 exists while if the
minimum wage is moderate then a single application equilibrium exists. Finally, for low application
costs, like kL, workers typically apply to three jobs in equilibrium.
(a) Equilibria (b) Welfare
Figure 2: Equilibria and Welfare in a 3x3 model under R3.
There are two aspects related to Figure 2(a) worth to discuss. The first refers to the effects
of an increase in the minimum wage on unemployment.7 The graph reveals that unemployment
is weakly decreasing in w. For high application costs, an increase in the minimum wage has no
impact on unemployment. By contrast, when application costs are moderate or low, unemployment
decreases in w. The reason for this result is that a higher minimum wage makes applying for more
jobs a more attractive strategy and thus a worker’s probability of being employed increases. This
could explain some of the controversies of the huge empirical literature on minimum wages, see
e.g. Brown (1999) for an overview. The second aspect pertains to the effects of application costs
on unemployment. The Figure reveals that, for a fixed minimum wage, unemployment is typically
weakly increasing in k. What happens is that for low application costs workers apply to all jobs
for sure; for intermediate costs they apply for two jobs only and run into the risk of remaining
unemployed. Finally, for high k they apply for a single job and fail more frequently to get a job.
Figure 2(b) shows the levels of welfare attained under the different equilibria. The most efficient
equilibrium is the one that maximizes output (number of matches times one) minus total application
cost. The graph shows the regions where a = 1, a = 2 and a = 3 are efficient respectively. The
minimum wage has no direct impact on efficiency, it only redistributes income from the firm to the
7Note that only for R3, unemployment is always decreasing in the number of applications.
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worker. It can however be used to select the most favorable equilibrium. A comparison of 2(a)
of and 2(b) reveals that workers can send either too many or too few applications in equilibrium.
For example, if k = 0.25 Figure 2(b) tells us that it is efficient that workers apply for a single
job; in that case Figure 2(a) shows that the minimum wage should be set sufficiently high so that
workers do participate in the labor market but not too high so that workers apply to multiple jobs.
Similarly, if k is close to zero, the minimum wage should be set sufficiently high to select the a = 3
equilibrium.
Wages and labor market tightness.
We are interested in the relationship between wage setting and the vacancy-to-unemployment
ratio v/u. Equilibrium wage distributions for different markets when workers apply for two jobs
(a = 2) are compared in Figure 3 below.8 Interestingly the wage distributions can be ranked
according to the first order stochastic dominance criterion. As we increase the v/u ratio, firms
compete more intensively for workers and offer higher wages. In Section 5 we shall show that this
result also arises in “large” labor markets.
Figure 3: Wage distributions for vxu=3x3, 3x2 and 4x2 (w = 0.2, a = 2).
4.2 The R1 recruitment technology
In this Section we derive equilibria in the 3x3 labor market model when firms can offer the job
only to one candidate. Under R1 there will be fewer matches in equilibrium than under R3, so we
8The derivations for the 3x2 and 4x2 are similar and can be obtained from the authors upon request.
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can think of this case as a high frictions case. Interestingly, workers can actually be better off in
this high frictions case because firms compete more intensively for them and the resulting wage
distribution (first order) stochastically dominates the one of the low frictions case. Most derivations
are similar to the ones under R3, so we only summarize for which values of k, a = 1, a = 2, and
a = 3 are equilibria and what the associated wage distributions are (details of the derivations can
be found in the Appendix).
For obvious reasons, if workers send just one application, the possibility of second round offers
has no bearing on wage setting behavior. Hence Claim 1 also holds here.
Assume now that workers send out 2 applications each. In this case, it is convenient to introduce
the following notation: let En denote the expected maximum wage from a random sample of size
n from the wage distribution F (w) and let
φ20(w) =
1
2
µ
86
162
E1 +
35
162
E2
¶
φ21(w) = −
17
162
E1 +
25
162
E2 +
15
162
E3
Claim 4 Let u, v = 3 and φ20(w) ≥ k ≥ φ21(w). Then under R1 a unique symmetric equilib-
rium exists where workers send out 2 applications and firms choose wages from the set [w, 35+43w78 ]
according to the cumulative wage distribution
F (w) = 43
35
(w −w)
(1−w) (8)
In equilibrium workers get a job with probability 121162 and firms obtain an expected payoff of πi =
43
81(1− w).
It is interesting to compare equilibrium wage setting with and without second round offers for
this case where a = 2. Figure 4 represents wage setting under R3, given in (4), and under R1
(equation (8)). The graph shows that (8) dominates (4) under the criterion of first-order stochastic
dominance. This implies that firm competitiveness is enhanced by the absence of second round offers
and thus worker expected utility may be greater in the more frictional case. For the intermediate
case R2 one would expect the wage distribution to lie in between the two curves.
We now present the results in case workers send 3 applications. For this purpose let
φ32(w) =
1
9
E2 +
1
27
E3
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Figure 4: Wage distributions under Ru and R1 (3x3 market, w = 0.2, a = 2).
Claim 5 Let u, v = 3 and φ32(w) ≥ k. Then under R1 a unique symmetric equilibrium exists
where workers send out 3 applications and firms choose wages from the set [w, 5+4w9 ] according to
the cumulative wage distribution
F (w) = 2
Ãr
1− w
1− w − 1
!
(9)
In equilibrium workers get a job with probability 1927 and firms obtain an expected payoff of πi =
4
9(1− w).
The difference with section 4.1 where firms could make second and third round offers is that
now a firm can fail to hire a worker and therefore there is competition for workers. This results in
wage dispersion and, interestingly, may result in greater worker welfare. To illustrate this, consider
the case that w = 3k; with second round offers, firms offer the minimum wage in equilibrium and
the payoff to a worker is thus zero. By contrast, in the case without second round offers there is
wage dispersion (for a low w a a = 3 equilibrium exists) and thus a worker’s expected payoff is
strictly positive. Hence, a more restrictive matching technology can increase the expected utility
of workers by making them effectively scarcer.
The set of parameters for which distinct equilibria exist under the recruitment technology R1
is represented in Figure 5(a).
A comparison of Figures 2(a) and 5(a) reveals that the screening technology does not affect the
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(a) Equilibria (b) Welfare
Figure 5: Equilibria and Welfare in a 3x3 model under R1.
qualitative observations we have made above. R1 has the advantage that the combinatorics needed
to calculate expected payoffs for firms and workers is easier for large labor markets. In what follows
we will confine the analysis to R1 and derive general properties of large labor markets.
Figure 5(b) plots aggregate welfare for the R1 case for different values of k. The main difference
with the R3 case in Figure 2(b) is that a = 3 is never efficient. The reason is that a = 1 and a = 3
generate the same number of matches because under a = 1 all three workers apply to one job while
the a = 3 case can be thought of as all three firms applying to one worker. Since applying is costly,
a = 3 can never be efficient and the minimum wage should be set low so that it prevents workers
from sending an excessive number of applications.
5 Large labor markets
In this section we let the labor market get large in the usual way, i.e., u, v → ∞, with vu = θ. We
restrict ourselves to the R1 case as argued above. We focus on existence and characterization of the
equilibrium with multiple applications (the equilibrium for a = 1 follows straightforwardly from
Proposition 3). We are also interested in how the equilibrium number of applications and the wage
distribution are affected by the market tightness parameter θ. Later in this Section we endogenize
θ by examining the free-entry long-run equilibrium and we study the efficiency properties of the
equilibrium.
Our first result characterizes wage setting behavior by firms, given workers strategies.
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Proposition 4 For any value of θ, and a ≥ 2, there exists an equilibrium wage distribution
F (w; a, θ,w) = 1− z(θ, a)z(θ, a)
"·
1− w
1− w
¸ 1
a−1
− 1
#
with support
£
w, 1− (1− w)(1− z(θ, a))a−1
¤
, where z(θ, a) = (1−exp(−
a
θ ))θ
a . Further, the distribu-
tion of wages F (w; a, θ,w+4) dominates in a first-order stochastic sense the distribution of wages
F (w; a, θ, w), and F (w; a, θ +4, w) first-order stochastically dominates F (w; a, θ, w).
Proof : Recall that ρ(u, v, a) is the ("urn ball") probability that a firm gets at least one applicant.
Thus:
ρ(θ, a) = lim
u,v→∞, vu=θ
³
1−
³
1− av
´u´
= 1− exp
³
−aθ
´
If the firm receives more than one application, the firm picks one of them at random. The (randomly
chosen) applicant has sent a total of a applications, so he can potentially get 1, 2, 3, ..., up to a
total of a− 1 other wage offers.
Let z(u, v, a) be the probability for one of the (a− 1) other applications of the worker to result
in a job offer. We use the result of Albrecht et al. (2003) that in the limit (u, v → ∞, vu = θ),
getting an offer from firm j is independent of getting an offer from firm i 6= j. Then, z(θ, a) =
limu,v→∞, vu=θ z(u, v, a) is simply equal to the number of firms with applications divided by the
total number of applications:
z(θ, a) = ρ(θ, a)θa =
¡
1− exp
¡
−aθ
¢¢
θ
a
A firm does not compete for the worker in question with probability (1− z(θ, a))a−1, competes
with just one other firm with probability (a−1)z(θ, a)(1−z(θ, a))a−2, and so on. Thus the expected
payoff to a firm i can be written as:
πi(w;F (·)) = ρ(θ, a)


a−1X
j=0
µ
a− 1
j
¶
z(θ, a)j(1− z(θ, a))a−1−jF (w)j

 (1− w) (10)
We can use the binomial theorem to simplify (10) to:
Eπi(w;F (·)) = ρ(θ, a) [1− z(θ, a) + z(θ, a)F (w)]a−1 (1− w)
Since in a mixed strategy equilibrium, all firms must be indifferent between strategies, profits
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of any firm must be equal to the profits of a firm that offers the minimum wage.
Eπi(w;F (·)) = ρ(θ, a) (1− z(θ, a))a−1 (1− w) (11)
Solving Eπ(w;F (·)) = Eπ(w;F (·)) yields the equilibrium wage distribution given above. The
upper bound of the support of the wage distribution can be found by setting F (w, a, θ) = 1. It is
easy to see that the upper bound of the distribution of wages is less than 1, increasing in a (for a
given θ) and in θ (for a given a).
To prove the results on stochastic dominance, we first note that F (·) is monotonically decreasing
in z(θ, a) and in w. Secondly we note that the function z(θ, a) is increasing in θ, which can be seen
from
dz(θ, a)
dθ =
θ exp(aθ )− (a+ θ)
aθ exp(aθ )
(12)
Notice that the LHS of the numerator increases exponentially in a while the RHS increases linearly;
thus, if dz(θ, a)/dθ > 0 for a = 2, then the same inequality holds generally. We then need to check
that θ(exp(2/θ)− 1) > 2, which holds for all θ > 0. The proof is now complete. ¥
Proposition 4 shows that an increase in the vacancy-to-unemployment ratio results in a right-
ward shift of the wage distribution. Thus, wage setting behavior becomes more competitive as the
market tightness parameter θ increases. An increase in the minimum wage w has a similar influence
on the wage distribution.
We now discuss how the average wage depends on the number of applications a. Using Propo-
sition 4, the expected wage can be written as (using integration by parts and changing the variable
of integration)
E[w; θ, a] = 1−
Z 1
0
(1− w)(1− z(θ, a))a−1
(1− z(θ, a)(1− y))a−1 dy.
The influence of the number of applications on the average wage is given by the following expression:
dE[w]
da =
∂E[w]
∂a +
∂E[w]
∂z
dz
da. (13)
We note that
∂E[w]
∂z =
Z 1
0
(1− w) (a− 1)y(1− z)a−2
(1− z(1− y))a > 0, (14)
dz
da =
1− z
a −
z
θ < 0 (15)
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while
∂E[w]
∂a = −
Z 1
0
(1− w) (1− z)a−1
(1− z(1− y))a−1 ln
·
1− z
1− z(1− y)
¸
dy > 0
where the last inequality follows from the fact that the integrand is negative. From the sign of these
partial derivatives, it follows that an increase in a results in two forces on competitiveness that go
in opposite directions. To understand this, consider a firm offering a job to a candidate when each
worker sends out a applications. If the worker increases the number of applications to a + 1, one
force increases the probability that the firm looses the worker to another firm simply because the
worker can get one additional offer with a higher wage. This effect increases firm competitiveness
and is captured by the first term of the RHS of equation (13). However, when all workers send
a+1 applications, the probability that each of the other a applications of the candidate in question
results in a job offer falls. This is simply due to the fact that all firms have more applicants to
choose from. This effect tends to weaken firms competition and is captured by the second term in
the RHS of (13). Which effect dominates turns out to be sensitive to market parameters but we
can prove the following result:
Corollary 1 There exists a sufficiently large eθ such that the expected wage increases in the number
of applications a for all θ ≥ eθ. Further, in a neighborhood of a = 2, the expected wage increases in
a for all θ.
Corollary 1 shows two results. First, that the expected wage is always increasing in the number of
applications in a neighborhood of a = 2. The idea here is that the second force (dz/da < 0) is small
when the number of applications is low. In that case, competition unambiguously increases when
workers send more applications. The second result is that the expected wage is always increasing
in the number of applications provided that there are sufficiently many firms around. The idea is
similar. When there are many firms in the market, an increase in the number of applications a
is likely to increase the number of firms that compete for the same worker, which increases firm
competitiveness. Numerical analysis of equation (13), however, has revealed that the expected
wage may fall in a for some parameters; this can be seen in Figure 6 where we have computed the
expected wage for different values of the labor market tightness parameter θ. The Figure shows
that when a is relatively large (e.g. 10 < a < 80) and 2 < θ < 4 then the expected wage decreases
in the number of applications workers send out. The graph also illustrates the stochastic dominance
result provided in Proposition 4: for a fixed a, the expected wage increases in θ.
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Figure 6: Expected wage and the number of applications (for different θ values, w = 0).
We now turn to the workers problem. A worker maximizes utility taking firm wage setting and
other workers strategies as given. The (gross) expected utility of a worker sending al applications
when the rest of the workers sends a applications is given by the following expression:
Eu(al; a) =
Z w
w


alX
j=1
µ
al
j
¶
z(θ, a)j(1− z(θ, a))al−j · j · F (w)j−1

wf(w)dw (16)
This expression tells us that a worker who sends al applications gets a single offer with prob-
ability alz(1 − z)al−1 and in this case the wage the worker expects to get is the mean wage; the
worker gets two offers with probability
¡al
2
¢
z2(1− z)al−2 and then the wage the worker expects to
get is the maximum of a random sample of size 2; and so on and so forth.9 Using the binomial
theorem, equation (16) can be rewritten as
Eu(al; a) = alz(θ, a)
Z w
w
[1− z(θ, a)(1− F (w))]al−1wf(w)dw
and integration by parts yields:
Eu(al; a) = w − w(1− z(θ, a))al
Z w
w
[1− z(θ, a)(1− F (w))]aldw
9 In the empirical job search literature an important distinction is made between the offer distribution, F and the
distribution of accepted wage offers which is in our case very similar to the term in brackets of (16): G (a, θ, w) =Sa−1
j=0
a−1
j

z(θ, a)j(1−z(θ, a))a−1−j ·F (w)j . This is basically a combination of the wage offer F (w) and the probability
that the worker accepts the offer which depends on the number of other offers and on the magnitude of the offer.
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Changing the variable of integration appropriately, we can rewrite a typical worker’s utility as:
Eu(al; a) =
Z 1
(1−z(θ,a))al

1− (1− w)(1− z(θ, a))
al−1
y
al−1
al

 dy
Integration of this expression yields:
Eu(al; a) = 1− (1− z(θ, a))al −
al(1− w)(1− z(θ, a))a−1
¡
1− (1− z(θ, a))al+1−a
¢
al + 1− a
(17)
The marginal gains to a worker sending al applications are given by
dEu(al; a)
dal
= −(1− z(θ, a))al log[1− z(θ, a)] + (1− w)(1− z(θ, a))
a−1
(al + 1− a)2£
(a− 1)(1− (1− z(θ, a))al+1−a) + al(al + 1− a) log[1− z(θ, a)](1− z(θ, a))al+1−a
¤
(18)
In symmetric equilibrium, the marginal gains from applying to a vacancies must be equal to the
marginal cost k. Invoking symmetry in (18) yields the following equilibrium condition:¯¯¯¯
dEu(al; a)
dal
¯¯¯¯
al=a
= k (19)
Or
−(1− z(θ, a))a log[1− z(θ, a)]+ (1−w)(1− z(θ, a))[(a−1)z(θ, a)+a(1− z(θ, a)) log[1− z(θ, a)] = k
(20)
The LHS of (20) represents the equilibrium marginal gains to workers when they apply to a vacan-
cies. Let us denote these marginal gains as Ψ(a; θ, w). We now make the following observations on
this function: (i) Ψ(a; θ, w) is continuous in a and strictly positive everywhere. The latter follows
from noting that
Ψ(a, θ,w) > −(1− w)(1− z)a log[1− z] + (1− w)(1− z)[(a− 1)z + a(1− z) log[1− z]
= (1−w)(1− z)a−1(a− 1)[z + (1− z) log(1− z)] > 0
where the last inequality follows from z ∈ (0, 1). (ii) It is easy to see that these marginal gains
converge to zero as a approaches infinity. These two conditions guarantee existence of equilibrium
for sufficiently low application cost k.10 As a result, we can state:
10To show uniqueness we need to check that, for any θ and w, dΨ(a)/da < 0. Analytically this is difficult but
numerical analysis of this derivative suggests that this is the case.
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Theorem 1 Let 0 < k ≤ Ψ(2, θ, w). Then an equilibrium exists where workers send a∗(≥ 2) appli-
cations and firms randomly choose wages from the set
£
w, 1− (1− w)(1− z(θ, a∗))a∗−1
¤
according
to the wage distribution
F (w; a∗, θ, w) = 1− z(θ, a
∗)
z(θ, a∗)
"·
1− w
1− w
¸ 1
a∗−1
− 1
#
where a∗ solves Ψ(a∗; θ, w)− k = 0. The equilibrium unemployment rate is (1− z (θ, a∗))a
∗
.
Our next question is how an increase in the vacancy-to-unemployment ratio, θ, affects the
equilibrium number of applications a∗ as well as unemployment rate. To answer this question, we
examine how the equilibrium marginal gains from applications change with θ.11 This follows from
the following derivative:
dΨ(a, θ, w)
dθ =
−(a− 1)(θ(eaθ − 1)− a)(1− z)a
θ(aeaθ − θ(eaθ − 1))2
[(a−1)θ(eaθ −1)+a(aeaθ −θ(eaθ −1)) log[1−z]) (21)
The sign of the first factor in (21) is negative since θ(eaθ − 1)− a is always positive. Thus, the sign
of this derivative depends only on the last factor in the numerator. Let Υ(θ, a) = (a − 1)θ(eaθ −
1)+a(aeaθ −θ(eaθ −1)) log[1−z]. We note that for any given a, z(θ, a) is continuous in θ, converges
to 1 as θ approaches infinity and converges to zero as θ approaches zero. As a result, Υ(θ, a) is
negative for θ small and positive for θ large. This implies that:
Proposition 5 There exists a sufficiently small θ such that for all θ < θ the equilibrium number
of applications a∗ is increasing in θ. Moreover, there exists a sufficiently large θ such that for all
θ > θ the equilibrium number of applications a∗ is decreasing in θ.
This result shows that the equilibrium number of applications is non-monotonic in θ. To our
knowledge this result is new. For example, Pissarides (2000) treats search intensity as a technology
parameter and finds that search effort is always increasing in θ. In our model, the marginal gains
from applying are decreasing in θ when θ is initially large. We illustrate this Proposition in Figure
7, where we have computed the equilibrium number of applications as a function of the market
tightness parameter θ, for different values of the minimum wage. The graph shows that the function
a∗(θ) is unimodular.
11We set w = 0 here for simplicity.
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Figure 7: Equilibrium number of applications and market tightness parameter θ.
The intuition is the following. We note that, for a fixed number of applications a, a change in
θ has an effect on the probability that a worker is hired as well as on the wage the worker expects
to be paid. When θ is small (θ → 0) the total number of applications swamps the total number of
vacancies. The probability that a given worker gets a job offer is quite low. A given firm receives
many applicants and the likelihood that it competes with another firm for a given candidate is close
to zero; as a result the wage distribution is “close” to the degenerate distribution at the minimum
wage. As θ increases, the probability a worker receives a job offer goes up, and also the probability
that firms have to compete for the same candidate rises; these two effects increase substantially
the marginal gains from sending applications. As θ increases further, those two effects become
weaker and weaker because the probability to get several job offers and the gains associated to
choosing from among several wages are already large and do not increase much further. Indeed for
θ relatively large each vacancy gets either no or one applicant, so the chance a firm is competing
with some other firm for the same candidate is close to 1; as a result the wage distribution is close
to the degenerate distribution at the competitive wage. Thus as θ increases beyond some critical
level, the marginal gains from sending applications become smaller.
We now ask how the equilibrium unemployment rate changes with the vacancy-to-unemployment
ratio. There are two effects at work here. For a given number of applications, an increase in θ
increases the chance that a worker gets an offer since applications are spread over a larger set
or vacancies. This effect tends to decrease the unemployment rate. However, an increase in the
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number of vacancies also changes the incentives workers have to apply for jobs (cf. Proposition 5).
An analytical answer to this question thus requires to examine the following derivative:
d((1− z(θ, a∗))a∗)
dθ =
∂((1− z(θ, a∗))a∗)
∂θ +
∂((1− z(θ, a∗))a∗)
∂a∗
∂a∗
∂θ .
The first term of the RHS of this equation is clearly negative. Some calculations show that
∂((1− z(θ, a∗))a∗)
∂a∗ = (1− z)
a∗
µ
log[1− z]− 1 + a
∗z
θ(1− z)
¶
.
This expression is positive when θ is small. For large θ it depends on a; if a is relatively small then
it is negative while if a is large it is positive. As a result, this derivative does not yield clear-cut
results. For the majority of the parameters, the two effects mentioned above work in opposite
directions. To gain some insight into this issue, we have numerically computed the probability
to remain unemployed as a function of the vacancy-to-unemployment ratio. The results show a
negative relationship between these two variables (see Figure 8 below).
Our last question in this section is how the minimum wage affects the equilibrium number
of applications a∗ and the unemployment rate. We first examine how the marginal gains from
applications change when the minimum wage goes up. This is given by the following derivative:
dΨ(a, θ, w)
dw = −(1− z(θ, a))
a−1[(a− 1)z(θ, a) + a(1− z(θ, a)) log[1− z(θ, a)]] (22)
We now make two remarks about this expression. One, for a fixed a, expression (22) converges to
zero as θ approaches zero and is positive and increasing in θ in a neighborhood of θ = 0. Thus, for
a sufficiently small θ the number of applications workers send in equilibrium is increasing in the
minimum wage. Two, we note that (22) is negative for large θ and goes to zero when θ approaches
infinity. Then for large θ, the equilibrium number of applications is decreasing in the minimum
wage.
To examine the implications of the minimum wage on unemployment rate, we compute
d((1− z(θ, a∗))a∗)
dw =
∂((1− z(θ, a∗))a∗)
∂a∗
∂a∗
∂w
As argued above, the first term of the RHS of this expression is positive when θ is small. As a
result, we conclude that an increase in the minimum wage raises unemployment whenever θ is low
enough. When θ is large and a moderate, this term is negative and thus a minimum wage increase
can decrease unemployment. Finally, when θ and a are both large this term is positive and then
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again an increase in w leads to lower unemployment. The following Proposition summarizes:
Proposition 6 There exists a sufficiently small θ such that for all θ < θ the equilibrium number
of applications a∗ is increasing in the minimum wage w. Moreover, there exists a sufficiently large
θ such that for all θ > θ the equilibrium number of applications a∗ is decreasing in w. Moreover,
the unemployment rate is increasing in w for sufficiently low θ, and for sufficiently high θ, while it
can decrease for intermediate values of θ.
The intuition behind this result is the following. First, note that an increase in the minimum
wage does not affect the probability that a worker is hired but it does affect the wage a worker
expects to get. When θ is low, the wage distribution is close to the degenerate distribution at
the minimum wage and thus an increase in the minimum wage shifts the marginal gains from
applications upwards and makes the distribution less compressed (note from Theorem 1 that the
maximum wage rises when the minimum wage increases). By contrast, when θ is large, the wage
distribution is close to the degenerate distribution at the competitive wage and thus an increase in
the minimum wage reduces the marginal gains from applications by making the distribution even
more compressed.12 The result in Proposition 6 is illustrated above in Figure 7. The graph shows
that when θ is low, workers react to an increase in the minimum wage by sending more applications,
while the opposite holds for θ relatively large.
The unemployment effects of an increase in the minimum wage also depend on initial conditions.
For θ low (approximately θ ≤ 1/2), the unemployment rate is monotonically increasing in a (see
Albrecht et al., 2003) and we know from Proposition 6 that an increase in the minimum wage raises
the equilibrium number of applications. As a result the minimum wage increases unemployment.
Likewise, when θ > 1/2 unemployment is first increasing and then decreasing in a. We know
from Proposition 5 that a∗ is excessive. Then, increasing the minimum wage compresses the wage
distribution and reduces the equilibrium number of applications which also increases employment.
What is striking here is that a minimum wage can be desirable because it reduces rather than
increases the number of applications. This is a very different mechanism than the ones that are
currently emphasized in the literature; making it more likely that a job is accepted (i.e. Burdett
and Mortensen, 1998), and increasing the search intensity or driving out less productive firms (i.e.
12Lee (1999) and Teulings (2003) give empirical evidence that minimum wage increases compress the wage
distribution.
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Van den Berg 2003). What is also striking is that a minimum wage is most desired when θ is large.
In section 5.2, we will further discuss the welfare effects of the minimum wage with endogenous
vacancy supply.
5.1 Efficiency
Is the labor market equilibrium constrained-efficient? In order to answer this question we define
the planner’s objective function as total output net of application cost and vacancy cost, where
total output is simply equal to the number of matches times 1. Dividing by unemployment gives
the welfare per worker:
Λ = max
a,θ
[1− (1− z (θ, a))a]− ak (23)
We first examine whether workers incentives to apply for jobs are socially optimal. The first
order condition with respect to a is
dΛ
da = − (1− z (θ, a))
a−1
·
(1− z(θ, a)) log[1− z (θ, a)]− adz (θ, a)da
¸
− k = 0.
Substituting in (15) yields
− (1− z (θ, a))a log[1− z (θ, a)]− (1− z (θ, a))a−1
µ
1− z(θ, a)− az(θ, a)θ
¶
= k (24)
A comparison of the workers equilibrium condition (20) with (24) yields the following result:
Proposition 7 The equilibrium number of applications is excessive from the point of view of social
welfare maximization.
Proof. The first term in (20) is identical to the first term in (24) so we need to show that
(1− w) ((a− 1)z + a(1− z) log[1− z]) > 1− z(θ, a)− az(θ, a)θ (25)
We first note that the RHS of (25) is negative. Second, the LHS of (25) is always positive for θ
large (θ > 2.81) and therefore the result follows. For θ small (θ < 2.81) the LHS is negative when
a is sufficiently small and thus we need to evaluate (25). Note that if the results holds for w = 0, it
also holds for all w. Setting w = 0, (25) can be written as a(1− z)a−1(z+(1− z) log[1− z])+ z(1−
(1− z)a−1+ az/θ− 1 > 0 and a three-dimensional plot of this expression shows that the inequality
is always satisfied. ¥
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This result, illustrated in Figure 8, shows that workers send too many applications in equilib-
rium. The left graph shows a comparison of the equilibrium number of applications a∗(θ) and the
efficient amount aSB(θ). The right graph shows the consequences of excessive applications on the
unemployment rate.
(a) Number of applications (b) Unemployment rate
Figure 8: Private and social incentives to send applications (k = 0.01, w = 0)
To get some intuition for this result, suppose that the minimum wage is set equal to 1. In
this case wage dispersion is fully eliminated and the only reason to send applications is to increase
the chance to get a job. A comparison between (20) and (24) when w = 1 reveals that there
are too many applications in equilibrium. The reason is that an individual worker does not take
into account the externalities his/her applications cause on the hiring probability of other workers
(the second term of (24) is negative). When the minimum wage is set below 1, there is wage
dispersion and hence workers have an additional motive to send applications, namely, to increase
their expected wage. As we mentioned before, the minimum wage can thus play a useful role in
reducing congestion externalities by compressing the wage distribution and reducing the equilibrium
number of applications.
This discussion suggests that the only way to get an efficient outcome in this economy is to
eliminate wage dispersion. Suppose the government fixed a mandatory wage bw. Using (16), workers’
expected utility would be EU(al; a) = (1− (1−z(a))al) bw. A comparison of the marginal gains from
applications in this case with the efficiency condition (24) leads to the following result.
Proposition 8 For any given θ, k, let ba be the solution to (24) and let bz = z(θ,ba). Then there
exists a mandatory wage bw = 1
1−ea(1−ez)ea−1( 1−ezea −
ez
θ )
for which the market equilibrium is (second-best)
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efficient.
6 Free entry of vacancies
In this Section, we examine the free-entry long-run equilibrium. We start with a consideration
of firm entry for an exogenously given number of applications a. Let c be the cost of opening a
vacancy. For a given number of workers u, and a given number of applications a, the free entry
equilibrium is given by the vacancy-to-unemployment ratio θ that solves Eπi(w;F (·))−c = 0 (along
with the equilibrium wage setting behavior given in Proposition 4). Or, using (11),
a
θ z(θ, a) (1− z(θ, a))
a−1 (1− w) = c (26)
For convenience, we rewrite this free-entry condition as:
log
·
az(θ, a)
θ
¸
+ (a− 1) log[1− z(θ, a)] + log[1− w] = log[c] (27)
Let us denote the LHS of this expression as Θ(θ, a). We first note that (27) has a unique solution
in θ for any given set of feasible parameters. This follows from the following three observations:
(i) limθ→0Θ(θ, a) = 0, (ii) limθ→∞Θ(θ, a) = −∞ and
(iii)
dΘ(θ, a)
dθ =
(a− 1)(1− eaθ )2θ2 + a2(eaθ + θ(1− eaθ ))
(1− eaθ )θ2(aeaθ + θ(1− eaθ ))
< 0 for all a ≥ 2.
Inspection of the free-entry condition (27) immediately shows that the long-run number of vacancies
decreases in the minimum wage, for any given a. The intuition is simple: entry becomes less
profitable as w gets larger.
We now ask how the free-entry number of vacancies depends on workers search activity. To
answer this question we examine how the gains from entry change with a. This is given by the
following derivative:
dΘ(θ, a)
da =
−(a− 1)(a+ θ(1− eaθ ))
a(aeaθ + θ(1− eaθ ))
+
−1
θ(1− eaθ )
+ log[1− z(θ, a)]. (28)
The sign of this expression depends in a complicated way on a and θ : the first term is positive,
while the second and the third terms are negative. However, it can be seen that in a neighborhood
of a = 2, dΘ(θ, a)/da is always negative. As a result, θ is initially decreasing in a. Numerical
analysis of (28) reveals that its sign can become positive for a relatively high a and intermediate
levels of θ. We have numerically calculated the free entry number of vacancies as a function of a;
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the results reveal that the number of vacancies that open in the free-entry equilibrium is typically
non-monotonic in a. Figure 9 shows θ as a function of a for various levels of the minimum wage. It
can be seen that θ initially falls sharply with a and then it can slightly increase in a. The intuition
is the following. Inspection of the LHS of equation (26) reveals that an increase in a leads to two
effects. The first effect is positive and tells us that the likelihood to get candidates is increasing in
a, while the second effect is negative and reflects the probability that one or more rival firms also
consider your candidate, which increases the equilibrium wage and reduces profits. These effects
are relatively important for low values of a but become insignificant as a gets large. The exponent
(a− 1) makes the second effect vanish faster than the first effect and this explains the result.
Figure 9: Free entry number of vacancies (for fixed a, c = 0.1).
We now look at the free-entry equilibrium when workers are active and decide how many
applications to send to maximize their expected utility. Taking into account equilibrium wage
setting (Proposition 4), a free-entry equilibrium is then characterized by the solution to the system
of equations (20) and (26). We note that both equilibrium conditions (20) and (26) are non-
monotonic and this makes it very difficult to characterize sets of parameters (c, k, w) for which the
existence and uniqueness of a long-run equilibrium is guaranteed. This is something we will not
pursue in this paper. However, to gain some insight into this issue we have simulated the economy
for multiple parameter values (c, k and w). We find that when application costs are low compared
to entry costs, a free-entry equilibrium with endogenous applications always exists and is uniquely
determined. (When entry costs are very low and application costs are large, there may be existence
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problems.) Figure 10 illustrates a market where both entry and application costs are relatively low
(c = k = 0.01 and w = 0). The curve labelled “U 0(a) − k” is the workers equilibrium condition
(20), while the curve labelled “Eπ = 0” is the zero-profits condition. It can be seen that the curves
intersect only once, at the point marked “Eq.” In this example, the long run equilibrium is given
by the pair (a∗, θ∗) = (20.5, 4.3).
Figure 10: Free-entry equilibrium (c = k = 0.01 and w = 0)
Using Figure 10, it is straightforward to ascertain the influence of parameters c and k on the
long-run equilibrium. A decrease in entry cost c shifts the free entry condition to the right. In
markets with very few vacancies (θ small), this results in a larger number of firms and in more
applications. By contrast, in markets with many vacancies (like in Figure 10), the number of
applications decreases. Similarly, we can ask how a decrease in application cost k affects the long-
run equilibrium. We note that this change shifts the workers’ equilibrium condition upwards, which
results in a larger number of applications and in entry of vacancies.
Next, we are interested in how the minimum wage w influences the long-run equilibrium. We
note that this influence is highly sensitive to the initial market conditions. First, we have seen how
an increase in the minimum wage can lead to more or less applications, depending on the number
of vacancies θ (Proposition 6). Second, an increase in w affects not only the workers’ equilibrium
condition but also the free entry condition. This is illustrated in Figure 11, where c = k = 0.01. The
solid curves correspond to a situation where w = 0, while the dashed curves show the case w = 0.2.
The graph reveals the following feature of the free-entry equilibrium: an increase in the minimum
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wage w always leads to exit and, if initially there are sufficiently many firms in the market, to more
applications; otherwise to fewer applications. This surprising result stems from the fact that if θ
is large, many wage offers are already close to the competitive wage and further increases of the
minimum wage therefore reduce the marginal gains of additional applications.
Figure 11: Free entry equilibrium for w = 0 (solid curves) and w = 0.2 (dashed curves).
The last issue we investigate is whether the free-entry long-run equilibrium is constrained effi-
cient. We know already that the answer to this question is negative because the private incentives
to send applications are excessive for any θ. However, we still can ask whether the free-entry equi-
librium number of firms is excessive or insufficient from a social welfare perspective. The planner’s
problem consists of maximizing Λ − cθ, where Λ is defined in equation (23). For a fixed a, the
optimal vacancy-to-unemployment ratio is then given by the following first order condition:
dΛ
dθ = a (1− z (θ, a))
a−1 dz (θ, a)
dθ − c = 0 (29)
Or, substituting the expression for dz/dθ :
dΛ
dθ = a (1− z (θ, a))
a−1
·
z(θ, a)
θ −
exp(−aθ )
θ
¸
− c = 0 (30)
Comparing (26) with (30) reveals that firms incentives to enter are not socially efficient. An
efficient outcome requires
z(θ, a)(1− w) = z(θ, a)− exp(−aθ ),
which implies that:
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Proposition 9 For any given number of applications a, there exists a sufficiently low minimum
wage bw such that for all w ≤ bw firms incentives to enter the labor market are excessive; moreover,
there exists a sufficiently large minimum wage ew such that for all w ≥ ew firms incentives to enter
the labor market are insufficient.
7 Final remarks
We presented a simple strategic wage setting game where workers must decide upon the number
of jobs they apply for and firms simultaneously post a wage taking into account the effect that
the wage has on the behavior of workers and where workers similarly take into account the effect
that their search intensity has on wages. Quite surprisingly, this model generates, even in the
most simple setting, many interesting insights. We show that an equilibrium where workers apply
to just one job exhibits unemployment and absence of wage dispersion; this type of Diamond
result cannot be sustained generally. An equilibrium where workers apply for two or more jobs
typically exhibits wage dispersion and unemployment. In addition, we showed that there exists a
first order stochastic dominance relation between wage distributions of labor markets with different
vacancy-to-unemployment ratios and minimum wages; however average wage is non-monotonic in
the number of applications. Finally, we showed that the resulting equilibrium is not efficient.
Workers cause too much congestion by sending out too many applications. Introduction of a
minimum wage can improve welfare when the vacancy-to-unemployment ratio is large since it
reduces the number of applications but the only way to align the private and the social incentives
is to impose a mandatory wage that eliminates wage dispersion altogether.
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Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1
(i) Since workers only observe the wage after they have applied to a firm, firms only have an
incentive to offer a worker w > w when the probability that the worker also gets an offer from a
competing firm is strictly positive. When a = 1 this occurs with probability 0, hence no firm has
an incentive to offer w > w. So when a = 1 the equilibrium wage distribution must be degenerate
at w = w.
(ii) Consider now the case in which min{u, v} > a ≥ 2 in equilibrium. We prove the statement
above by contradiction. Assume that all firms post some wage w in [w, 1) in equilibrium. The
payoff of a firm depends positively on the probability ρ that a vacancy succeeds in hiring a worker
and negatively on the posted wage. First, we show that a vacancy remains vacant with a strictly
positive probability, i.e., ρ < 1. When u < v, this is easy because then ρ ≤ uv < 1, for all a. If
u ≥ v, a firm with applicants fails to hire a worker when all its applicants get hired by other firms.
To show that ρ < 1 also in this case, it is enough to find an event that can occur with positive
probability where some firm i with applicants fails to fill its vacancy. An example of such an event
is the case where some firm i only gets a single application from one of the workers, say j. It is
obvious that this event can indeed occur with positive probability, for all 2 ≤ a ≤ v − 1 and for
any u. Suppose this event is realized; then there is a positive probability that this applicant j gets
hired by some other firm different than i; as a result ρ < 1. Second, we establish a contradiction.
Note that equilibrium the profits to firm i are πi = ρ(1 − w). We now show that firm i can do
better by deviating and offering a higher wage, say w + ε. If this is so, the firm in question will
always succeed in hiring a worker, provided that it obtains at least an application. This occurs
with probability 1−
¡
1− av
¢u , which is greater than ρ.13 By deviating, the firm would make profits
πDi =
£
1−
¡
1− av
¢u¤
(1−w− ε), which are strictly higher than πi for sufficiently small ε > 0. This
argument rules out all wages in [w, 1). It remains to be proved that a wage distribution degenerated
at w = 1 cannot be an equilibrium either when min{u, v} > a ≥ 2. Note that in this case firms
would make zero profits in equilibrium. If a firm deviates and offers a lower wage, say w, this firm
would obtain a profit πDi = ρD(1−w), where ρD is the probability that the deviant is matched with
a worker. To rule out this case we need to show that ρD > 0. Consider first that u < v. To prove
that ρD > 0, it is sufficient to give an example of an event that can arise with positive probability
where the deviant hires a worker, for 2 ≤ a ≤ u. This is easy because even if the deviant gets
only one applicant, there is a positive probability that this candidate gets no offers from any of the
other firms to which she applied for a job. Therefore, ρD > 0 when u < v and a firm would gain
by deviating. Next consider u ≥ v. Let us number the vacancies from 1 to V − 1 and the workers
from 1 to U . Once again, to prove that ρD > 0, it is sufficient to find a positive-probability event
in which the deviant hires a worker for sure, now for 2 ≤ a ≤ v − 1. An example of such an event
is the case where worker j applies for vacancy i = j, for the deviant’s vacancy and possibly for
some other vacancies and worker 1 is picked by vacancy 1, worker 2 is picked by vacancy 2, ..., and
worker V − 1 is picked by vacancy V − 1. In that case, the deviant hires worker V (or any other
worker from V to U) with probability 1. Therefore, the deviant would gain by deviating. So we
have established that if min{u, v} > a ≥ 2, there is no wage equilibrium in pure strategies. The
same type of arguments can be used to show that this also holds when a = u < v. We finally argue
that if an equilibrium wage distribution F (w) exists, it must be atomless. The proof follows the
arguments above and we only sketch it here. Suppose, on the contrary, that there were atoms in the
13Since p =
£
1−
¡
1− av
¢u¤
[1− Pr (all candidates get hired by other firms)] .
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wage distribution and consider a firm offering a wage bw such that dF ( bw) > 0. Then, with strictly
positive probability, such firm would tie with all other firms at offering bw, and as shown before,
the firm would gain by offering a slightly higher wage. An atom at the competitive wage cannot
arise in equilibrium either because a firm offering such wage would have an incentive to deviate
and offer a lower one. Those arguments hold for any recruiting technology Rm. In addition, under
R1,...,Ru−1 they also hold for v > a > u.
(iii) Under Ru. If a = v ≤ u, each firm gets u applications and hires a worker with probability 1
and no firm has an incentive to offer a wage above the minimum wage. Under R1,...,Ru−1, there is
always competition for workers and therefore the arguments in (ii) also hold here. This completes
the proof. ¥
Proof of Proposition 3
In this appendix we calculate a sufficient condition for an equilibrium with a = 1 to exist. The
first condition is that participation yields non-negative payoffs. Hence, γ1 (·)w ≥ k. The second
condition is that deviating to a = 2 is not profitable. To calculate the payoffs from such a deviation
we must first calculate the probability to get a job offer when applying for 2 jobs when the other
workers apply to one job. Let E1 be the probability that the deviant’s first application results
in an offer and E2 be the probability that his second application results in an offer. Note that
P (E1) = zˆ = eρvu+1 =

1−(1− 1v )
u−1
(1− 2v )

v
u+1 , where bρ = ³1− ¡1− 1v¢u−1 (1− 2v )´ is the probability
that a vacancy has applications (one minus the probability that non-deviant workers do not apply
minus the probability that the deviant does not apply). The probability that at least one of
the deviant’s applications results in an offer is 1 − P
¡
E1
¢
P
¡
E2|E1
¢
which is only in the limit
(u, v → ∞, vu → θ) equal to 1 − P
¡
E1
¢2
, see Albrecht et al. (2004). A negative dependency is a
general property of finite urn-ball type of models: if a subset of the urns receives many balls then
a disjoint subset of the urns must receive a few balls. Hence the fact that the first application does
not result in a match gives implicit information on the total number of applications the firm where
this application landed had. The likelihood that the second one does not result in an offer therefore
becomes smaller. If E1, ..., En are negatively associated:14
P
¡
E1, ..., En
¢
≤
¡
PE1
¢n ,
Next, we turn to the proof. Assume for the moment that a = 1 in equilibrium. First note that an
applicant gets either a single wage offer or no wage offer at all. As a result, a firm offering a wage
to a worker faces no competition from other firms to hire such worker. This implies that firms have
no incentives to offer wages above the minimum wage since doing so does not increase the hiring
probability. Hence, the equilibrium payoff to a firm is πi = ρ(1 − w), where ρ is the probability
of succeeding in hiring a worker. Note that the number of applications that a firm receives is a
random variable with a bin(u, a/v) distribution. Then, ρ is the standard “urn-ball”probability to
get one or more applicants, i.e., ρ = 1−
¡
1− 1v
¢u .
We now check that a = 1 is indeed a worker’s best-response. In equilibrium, the expected utility
for a worker is equal to Ue = zw − k, where z is the probability that a worker gets a job. This
probability can be easily computed, z = ρvu . Expected utility in equilibrium is non-negative if and
only if the condition k ≤ γ(w;u, v) holds. A potential deviant worker who sends out 2 applications
14 I.e. for the 3x3 case,
³
1− P
¡
E1
¢2´
= 11271296 while 1− P
¡
E1
¢
P
¡
E2|E1
¢
= 1112 .
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will get a job with a probability that is at least 1−(1− zˆ)2 (where zˆ is given above). So her expected
utility is at least Ued(a = 2) =
³
1− (1− zˆ)2
´
w − 2k. For a symmetric equilibrium, we need that
workers have no incentives to deviate, i.e. it must be the case that zw− k ≥
h
1− (1− zˆ)2
i
w− 2k,
or k ≥
h
1− (1− zˆ)2
i
w − γ1(w;u, v). Finally, the upper bound comes from setting zˆ = 1. We note
that this condition also ensures that a worker does not find it beneficial to apply to 3 or more
vacancies. The proof is now complete. ¥
B Hiring probabilities for R3 (v = 3, u = 3, a = 2)
B.1 Derivation of pn:3
p1:3,p2:3and p3:3 are the probabilities that a firm offering the highest, second highest and lowest wage
in the market hires a worker, respectively. Note that p1:3 = 1 −
¡
1− 23
¢3
= 2627 . To calculate p2:3,
note that the second highest wage firm always hires a worker when it has 2 or more applicants and
it remains vacant when it has one applicant and this applicant gets hired by the highest wage firm.
The likelihood that the candidate at the second highest wage firm also applied to the highest wage
firm is 12 . Given that the candidate in question is the only applicant at the second highest wage firm
and he also applied to the highest wage firm, there must be 3 candidates at the highest wage firm so
he gets hired by that firm with probability 13 . The probability that a firm gets exactly 1 candidate
is
¡3
1
¢ ¡
2
3
¢ ¡
1
3
¢2
= 627 =
2
9 , and the probability to get 2 or more candidates is: 1−
1
27 −
6
27 =
20
27 . Thus
p2:3 = 1
27
0 +
6
27
µ
1
2
µ
1− 1
3
¶
+
1
2
1
¶
+
20
27
1 =
25
27
To calculate p3:3, note that a firm always hires a worker when it gets 3 applicants, which happens
with probability 827 ; a firm fails to hire a worker when all its candidates get hired by the highest
and/or the second highest wage firm. Thus:
p3:3 = 1
27
0 +
6
27
µ
1
2
µ
1
2
1 +
1
2
0
¶
+
1
2
µ
2
3
1
2
+
1
3
0
¶¶
+
12
27
Ã
1 + 1 + 34 +
3
4
4
!
+
8
27
1 =
21
27
B.2 Derivation of qn:3
The probabilities of being hired at respectively the 1st, 2nd or 3rd highest wage, q1:3,q2:3and q3:3,
can be calculated as follows. First note that a worker applies to vacancy A with probability 23
and, conditional on applying, she is the only applicant at vacancy A with probability 19(workers 2
and 3 both have a
¡
1
3
¢2chance to not apply to the same vacancy worker 1 has applied to). With
probability 49 she is one of the two candidates at A, and with probability
4
9 she is one of the 3
candidates. Hence:
q1:3 = 2
27
µ
1 + 4 · 1
2
+ 4 · 1
3
¶
=
26
81
q2:3 = 1
27
µ
1
3
+ 2 · 1
2
+ 4 · 1
4
+
2
3
+ 0
¶
+
1
27
µ
5 · 1
2
+ 2 · 3
4
+
1
3
+ 1
¶
=
25
81
q3:3 = 1
27
µ
5 · 1
2
+ 2 · 1
4
+
1
3
+ 0
¶
+
1
27
µ
2
3
+ 6 · 1
2
+
1
3
+ 0
¶
=
22
81
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The worker remains unemployed with probability 1− q1:3 − q2:3 − q3:3 = 16/162.
B.3 Derivation of qn:33 and qn:31
Let q1:33 be the probability that a deviant worker who sends 3 applications gets the highest wage;
likewise, let q2:33 and q3:33 be the probability that she gets the second highest wage and the lowest
wage, respectively. Standard combinatorics yields:
q1:33 =
1
9
1 +
4
9
1
2
+
4
9
1
3
=
13
27
,
q2:33 =
1
9
2
3
+
4
9
Ã
1
22 +
1
42
4
!
+
4
9
Ã
0 + 142 +
1
3
4
!
=
1
3
,
q3:33 =
1
9
1
3
+
4
9
Ã
1
42 +
1
62
4
!
+
4
9
Ã
0 · 2 + 142
4
!
=
5
27
.
In this case, the deviant gets a job for sure. Consider a worker who deviates and sends out
just one application. As before, let q1:31 be the probability that a deviant worker gets the maximum
wage, q2:31 be the probability she gets the second highest wage, and q3:31 be the probability to get the
lowest wage.
q1:31 =
1
3
µ
1
9
1 +
4
9
1
2
+
4
9
1
3
¶
=
13
81
q2:31 =
1
3
Ã
1
9
1 +
4
9
Ã
1
22 +
3
42
4
!
+
4
9
Ã
1
23 +
1
3
4
!!
=
16
81
q3:31 =
1
3
Ã
1
9
1 +
4
9
Ã
3
42 + 1 · 2
4
!
+
4
9
Ã
1 · 2 + 122
4
!!
=
5
18
.
In this case the deviant worker remains unemployed with probability 59/162.
C Derivation of equilibria under R1 for (u = 3, v = 3)
Proposition 3 shows that when workers apply for just one job, firms offer the minimum wage for
any recruiting technology. As a result, the equilibrium characterization for a = 1 is identical to
that in the R3 case.
Next, take a = 2. This generates a wage-dispersed equilibrium. To derive the payoff to a firm i
offering a wage w when the rivals offer a random draw from F (w), we consider the following events.
First, note that the number of applicants a firm receives is bin
¡
u, av
¢
, so the probability firm i
has no applicants is 1/27, that it has 1 applicant is 6/27, that it has two applicants is 12/27 and
that it has 3 applicants is 8/27. If firm i has one applicant, the other firm where this candidate
applied to has in total 3 applications with probability 1. If firm i has 2 candidates, the firm picks
one of them at random and makes an offer to him/her. It may be the case that the chosen worker
is queueing together with the two other workers in the other firm he applied for, which happens
with probability 1/2 and in this case firm i hires the worker with probability 2/3 + 1/3F (w); or
it may be the case that the chosen worker has just one competitor for the offer of the other firm
he applied for, which happens with probability 1/2 and in this case firm i hires the worker with
probability 1/2 + 1/2F (w). If firm i has three applicants is, the firm picks one of them at random
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again and makes an offer to him/her. The chosen applicant may be queueing with no other worker
in the other vacancy he applied for, which happens with probability 1/4 and in this case firm i
hires the worker with probability F (w); or it may be the case that the chosen worker is queueing
with just one other worker in the other vacancy he applied for, which happens with probability 2/4
and in this case firm i hires the worker with probability 1/2 + 1/2F (w); or, finally, it may be the
case that the chosen worker is queueing with two other workers in the other vacancy he applied
for, which happens with probability 1/4 and in this case firm i hires the worker with probability
2/3 + 1/3F (w).
Collecting terms gives the following payoff:
πi(w;F (w) =
·
6
27
µ
2
3
+
1
3
F (w)
¶
+
12
27
µ
1
2
µ
2
3
+
1
3
F (w)
¶
+
1
2
µ
1
2
+
1
2
F (w)
¶¶
+
8
27
µ
1
4
µ
2
3
+
1
3
F (w)
¶
+
2
4
µ
1
2
+
1
2
F (w)
¶
+
1
4
F (w)
¶¸
(1−w)
=
6
27
2
3
+
12
27
µ
1
2
2
3
+
1
2
1
2
¶
+
8
27
µ
1
4
2
3
+
2
4
1
2
¶
+
µ
6
27
1
3
+
12
27
µ
1
2
1
3
+
1
2
1
2
¶
+
8
27
µ
1
4
1
3
+
2
4
1
2
+
1
4
¶¶
F (w)
=
µ
43
81
+
35
81
F (w)
¶
(1− w)
Note that when firm i offers the highest possible wage in the market it fails to hire a worker with
probability 3/81. Setting w = w yields equilibrium profits: πi(w) = 4381 (1− w) . Let w denote the
upper bound of the wage distribution. In a mixed strategy equilibrium, the firm must be indifferent
between offering any wage in [w,w] so F (w) must solve:µ
43
81
+
35
81
F (w)
¶
(1− w) = 43
81
(1− w)
which yields (4). Setting F (w) = 1 and solving for w one finds the upper bound of the wage
distribution.
Let E1, E2, E3 denote the expected maximum wage from a sample of size 1, 2, and 3, respec-
tively.15 The expected payoff to a worker in equilibrium is given by:
Ue(a = 2) = 86
162
E1 +
35
162
E2 − 2k
where 86/162 is the probability that the worker receives just one job offer and 35/162 is the
probability that he/she gets two job offers. We note that a worker gets no job with a probability
equal to 41/162.
In equilibrium, a worker must obtain non-negative expected utility, which yields the condition:
k ≤ φ20 =
86
324
E1 +
35
324
E2 (31)
and there should be no profitable upward or downward deviation. The expected utility for a deviant
15For a given wage distribution F (w), the expected maximum wage from a random sample of size n is En =U∞
−∞ nF (w)
n−1f(w)dw.
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who sends 3 applications is given by
Ued(ad = 3) =
69
162
E1 +
60
162
E2 +
15
162
E3 − 3k
where 69/162 is the probability that the worker receives just one job offer, 60/162 is the probability
that he/she gets two wage offers and 15/162 is the probability he/she receives three offers. We note
that in this case the probability the worker remains unemployed is 18/162. Deviating to a = 3 is
not profitable if
Ue(a = 2) ≥ Ued(ad = 3), or: (32)
k ≥ φ23 = −
16
162
E1 +
25
162
E2 +
15
162
E3
Next, we have to establish when it is not profitable to deviate to a = 1. Consider a worker who
deviates and sends out just one application. The expected utility is
P (0 offers) = 1
9
µ
2
3
+
2
3
+
1
2
+
2
3
+
2
3
+
1
2
+
1
2
+
1
2
+ 0
¶
=
14
27
Ued(a = 1) =
13
27
E1 − k
where 13/27 is the probability of getting employed. Deviating to a = 1 is not profitable if:
Ue(a = 2) ≥ Ued(ad = 1) or: (33)
k ≤ φ21 =
7
162
E1 +
35
162
E2
We note that φ20 < φ21 so the condition (33) is implied by condition (31). So it must be the case
that φ20 ≥ k ≥ φ23 for an equilibrium with a = 2 to exist.
We finally consider the case where each worker sends 3 applications. The payoff to a firm offering
a wage w when the rivals offer a random draw from F (w) is calculated as follows. First, note that
firm i picks a worker at random and makes an offer to him/her. The firm hires this worker surely
when the other two firms offer their vacancy to different workers, i.e., with probability (2/3)2.
Second, with probability 2(1/3)(2/3) at least one other firm offers its job to the worker of firm
i, in which case firm i only hires if its wage is higher, i.e., with probability F (w). Finally, with
probability (1/3)2 both other firms offer their job to the candidate of firm i, in which case firm i
only hires with probability F (w)2. This leads to the following payoff:
πi(w;F (w)) =
·
1
9
F 2(w) + 4
9
F (w) + 4
9
¸
(1− w)
Solving the equation πi(w;F (w)) = πi(w) yields the distribution function provided in the text.
Setting F (w) = 1 and solving for w yields w = (5 + 4w)/9.
To calculate the expected payoff for a worker when a = 3, note that we can think of this process
as each firm applying to 1 worker so the number of offers a worker gets is bin
¡
v, 1u
¢
. The worker
receives three offers with probability (1/3)3, two offers with probability 3(1/3)2(2/3), one offer with
probability 3(1/3)(2/3)2.and no offer with probability (2/3)3. As a result,
Ue(a = 3) = 4
9
E1 +
2
9
E2 +
1
27
E3 − 3k
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In equilibrium, a worker must obtain non-negative expected utility, which yields the condition
k ≤ Ω30 =
4
27
E1 +
2
27
E2 +
1
81
E3. (34)
In addition, there should be no profitable downward deviation. The expected utility for a deviant
who sends just 2 applications is calculated taking into account that the worker gets one offer with
probability 2(1/3)(2/3) and two offers with chance (1/3)2. We note that the worker receives no
offer with probability (2/3)2.This yields a payoff
Ued(ad = 2) =
4
9
E1 +
1
9
E2 − 2k
Deviating to a = 2 is not profitable if:
Ue(a = 3) ≥ Ued(ad = 2) or:
k ≤ Ω32 =
1
9
E2 +
1
27
E3. (35)
Deviation to a = 1 is not profitable provided that
Ue(a = 3) ≥ Ued(ad = 1) =
1
3
E1 − k or:
k ≤ Ω31 =
1
2
·
1
9
E1 +
2
9
E2 +
1
27
E3
¸
. (36)
We note that Ω32 < Ω31 < Ω30 so the condition (35) implies conditions (34) and (36).
D Proof Corollary 1
To prove that the expected wage is initially increasing in a for all parameters, we evaluate (13) at
a = 2. This yields
dE[w]
da
¯¯¯¯
a=2
=
∂E[w]
∂z
dz
da
¯¯¯¯
a=2
+
∂E[w]
∂a
¯¯¯¯
a=2
= (1− w)
Z 1
0
y
³
1−z(θ,2)
2 −
z(θ,2)
θ
´
− (1− z(θ, 2)) (1− z(θ, 2)(1− y)) log
h
1−z(θ,2)
1−z(θ,2)(1−y)
i
(1− z(θ, 2)(1− y))2 dy.
Note that the denominator of the integrand of this expression is positive, for all y.Now we show
that the numerator is also positive, for all y. That is, we need to show that
− (1− z) (1− z + zy) log
·
1− z
1− z + zy
¸
≥ y
µ
z
θ −
1− z
2
¶
(37)
for all y, where we have suppressed the arguments of z(·) to save on notation. Notice that (37) holds
for y = 0. Moreover, the LHS of (37) increases in y at a rate z (1− z)
³
1− log
h
1−z
1−z+zy
i´
, while
the RHS does so at a constant rate
¡
1−z
2 −
z
θ
¢
. Now we note that z (1− z)
³
1− log
h
1−z
1−z+zy
i´
>
z (1− z) (1− log[1− z]) >
¡ z
θ −
1−z
2
¢
, for all θ, where the last inequality can be easily plotted in θ
using the expression for z(θ, 2) given above. Thus, the expected wage increases in the number of
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applications in a neighborhood of a = 2, for all θ.
We now prove that if θ is sufficiently large, the expected wage is increasing in the number of
applications a. We can rewrite (13) in the following way:
dE[w]
da = (1−w)
Z 1
0
(1− z)a−1
(1− z(1− y))a
"
(a− 1)y
Ã
1
a −
1
a
1−e−
a
θ
− θ
!
− (1− z(1− y)) log
·
1− z
1− z(1− y)
¸#
dy.
Notice that the sign of this derivative depends on the sign of the term between square brackets.
The LHS of that term is negative, decreases as θ increases and converges to − 1a as θ →∞ while its
RHS is positive, increases in θ and converges to infinity as θ →∞. As a result there exists eθ such
that for all θ > eθ, the sign of this derivative is positive. The proof is now complete. ¥
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